Abstract—These instructions give you guidelines for Abstract—Message validation is a standout amongst the best approaches to obstruct unapproved and tainted messages from being sent in remote sensor systems (WSNs). Therefore, numerous message verification plans have been created, in light of either symmetric-key cryptosystems or open key cryptosystems. This paper presents description of various message authentication schemes like Statistical en route filtering, interleaved hop by hop authentication scheme, perturbed polynomial-based technique, hop by hop message authentication scheme.

Keywords--Statistical Enroute Filtering(SEF); Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC); Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN).

I. INTRODUCTION

The System which allows the sender to send a message to the receiver end in such a way that if the modified message will almost detected by receiver that termed as message authentication. Each user while using message authentication expects that each and every message should be pass as in same condition that it was sent without adding any modified bits or extra characters. Wireless sensors have special characteristics because of total absence of infrastructure or administrative support these are wireless networks. They have limited bandwidth, energy constraints, low computational capabilities. Instead of all limitation WSN in useful in where is communication is done without infrastructure support.

Security is the major constraint in WSN ,as sensor node may be deployed by attacker and the private information may get hacked . In many cases it is sufficient to secure data transfer between the sensor nodes and the base station. In particular, the base station must be able to ensure that the received message was sent by specific sensor node and not modified while transferring. Many WSN applications such as health-care monitoring systems or military domains needs strong and lightweight authentication schemes to secure data from unprivileged users. That is really insecure. To overcome all such security issue many different scheme that had been discover. Some schemes deals with detecting the compromised node , or detecting the injected false message in the network or giving special authorization to the sender or receiver, Encryption of decryption is the famous method for providing the security. WSN have various security challenges due to its nature these challenges are like Communication, resource, sensor node limitation, lack of fixed infrastructure, unknown network, topology for deployment. In wireless sensor network the unofficial and corrupted massage can be effectively prevented by message authentication.

II. LITERATURE SURVEY

1) STATISTICAL ENROUTE FILTERING

- Early detecting and dropping of false data reports: Identifying false reports allows the user to avoid taking responses to fabricated events. Although this can be done either during the data delivery process or at the sink after the data is delivered, early en-route detection of such reports can prevent them from reaching the sink, thus saving energy and bandwidth resources of nodes on data forwarding paths.

- Low computation and communication overhead: Given the resource constraints of low-end sensor nodes, we rule out solutions based on computation-intensive asymmetric cryptography, and only use more efficient building blocks such as hash functions.

SEF comprises of three segments which work in show to distinguish and sift through produced messages: (1) Each authentic report conveys numerous MACs (as a Bloom channel created by distinctive nodes that recognize the same
jolt, (2) Intermediate sending nodes identify wrong MACs and sift through false reports on the way, and (3) The sink checks the rightness of every MAC and disposes of staying false reports that evade on the way sifting. In SEF there is a worldwide key pool. However just the sink has the information of the whole pool. Every sensor stores a little number of keys that are attracted a randomized design from the worldwide key pool before sending. When a jolt shows up in the field, numerous distinguishing nodes choose a CoS node that produces the report. Every identifying node creates a keyed MAC for the report utilizing one of its put away keys. The CoS node gathers the MACs and appends them to the report as a Bloom channel. These numerous MACs on the whole go about as the evidence that a report is genuine. A report with a deficient number of MACs won’t be sent.

The sink serves as the last objective attendant for the framework. When it gets reports around an occasion, the sink confirms each MAC conveyed in the report on the grounds that it has complete learning of the worldwide key pool. False reports with mistaken MACs that sneak through on the way separating will then be identified.

Advantages:

The SEF design seeks to achieve the following goals:

• Early detecting and dropping of false data reports: Identifying false reports allows the user to avoid taking responses to fabricated events. Although this can be done either during the data delivery process or at the sink after the data is delivered, early en-route detection of such reports can prevent them from reaching the sink, thus saving energy and bandwidth resources of nodes on data forwarding paths

• Low computation and communication overhead: Given the resource constraints of low-end sensor nodes, we rule out solutions based on computation-intensive asymmetric cryptography, and only use more efficient building blocks such as hash functions.

Disadvantages:

• SEF’s location and sifting force increments with the sending thickness and the sensor field size.

• SEF deliberately constrains the measure of security data allotted to every individual node. Then again, collective sifting of false reports obliges that nodes offer certain measure of security data. The more security data every sending node has, the more successful the in transit sifting can be, additionally the more mystery the attacker can get from a traded off.

2) INTERLEAVED HOP BY HOP AUTHENTICATION SCHEME:

This scheme involves the following five phases:

• In the node introduction and sending stage, the key server stacks each node with an exceptional id, and vital keying materials that permit the node to build up pair wise keys with different nodes. After organization, a node first sets up an one-jump pair wise key with each of its neighbours.

• In the affiliation disclosure stage, a node finds the ids of its related nodes. This procedure may be started by the base station intermittently, or by a node that recognizes the disappointment of a neighbour node.

• In the report underwriting stage, t + 1 nodes create a report synergistically when they identify the event of an occasion of hobby. All the more particularly, every partaking node processes two MACs over the occasion, one utilizing its key imparted to the BS, and the other utilizing its pair wise key imparted to its upper related node. At that point it sends the MACs to its bunch head. The group head gathers MACs from all the taking an interest nodes, wraps them into a report, and after that advances the report towards BS.

• In the in transit separating stage, each sending node confirms the MAC registered by its lower affiliation node, and after that expels that MAC from the got report. On the off chance that the check succeeds, it then registers and append another MAC taking into account its pair wise key imparted to its upper related
node. At last, it advances the report to the following node towards the BS.

- In the base station check stage, the BS checks the report subsequent to getting it. In the event that the BS recognizes that $t+1$ nodes have embraced the report effectively, it acknowledges the report; else, it basically disposes of the report.

**Advantages:**

- This scheme can add a node feedback mechanism to facilitate compromise detection.

**Disadvantages:**

- The number of hops before an injected data packet is detected and discarded should be as small as possible.
- This scheme only accept packets authenticated by one of the nodes from its neighbour set. This implies that a compromised node can only mount an attack locally and on its own behalf.

3) **A PERTURBED POLYNOMIAL-BASED TECHNIQUE:**

In this scheme, a series of message authentication schemes were introduced. The study is conducted evolutionarily through several steps. The scheme specification is as follows:

- System Initialization.
- Constructing a perturbation polynomial for message verification purpose and an ID space for senders.
- Constructing a perturbation polynomial for authentication purpose and an ID space for receivers/forwarders.
- Node Initialization.
- Message Sending at Senders.
- Message Verification at Receivers/Forwarder.

**Advantages:**

- This plan receive polynomials for message verification, which gives higher flexibility than existing validation systems in light of different MACs and in the meantime, keeps the benefit of prompt confirmation held by those procedures.
- Messages are validated and checked through assessing polynomials, which brings about lower overhead than existing unbalanced cryptography-based verification strategies, for example, computerized mark.
- Independent and arbitrary variables are utilized to annoy polynomial shares (of a framework wide mystery polynomial) that preloaded to individual nodes, which altogether builds to the unpredictability for the interloper to break the mystery polynomial, and consequently renders the proposed way to deal with be versatile to node.

**Disadvantages:**

- This methodology offers data theoretic security of the mutual mystery key when the quantity of messages transmitted is more prominent than the edge the polynomial can be completely recuperated and the framework is totally broke.

4) **HOP BY HOP MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION SCHEME:**

Message verification assumes a key part in impeding unapproved and tainted messages from being sent in systems to spare the valuable sensor vitality. Hence, numerous verification plans have been proposed in writing to give message realness and trustworthiness confirmation for remote sensor systems (WSNs). These plans can to a great extent be partitioned into two classes: open key based methodologies and symmetric-key based methodologies.

The symmetric-key based methodology obliges complex key administration, absences of versatility, and is not versatile to huge quantities of node compromise attack as message sender and the collector need to share a mystery key. The mutual key is utilized by the sender to create a message validation code (MAC) for each transmitted message. Nonetheless, for this system, the genuineness and
uprightness of the message must be checked by the node with the common mystery key, which is for the most part shared by a gathering of sensor nodes. An interloper can bargain the key by catching a solitary sensor node. What's more, this strategy does not work in multicast systems. To tackle the adaptability issue, a mystery polynomial based message confirmation plan was presented in. The thought of this plan is like an edge mystery sharing, where the limit is dictated by the level of the polynomial. This methodology offers data theoretic security of the common mystery key when the quantity of messages transmitted is not exactly the edge. The moderate nodes check the genuineness of the message through a polynomial assessment. Be that as it may, when the quantity of messages transmitted is bigger than the limit, the polynomial can be completely recuperated and the framework is totally broken.

- For individuals all in all key based approach, each message is transmitted close by the propelled sign of the message created utilizing the sender's private key. Each moderate forwarder and the last collector can verify the message utilizing the sender's open key. One of the constraints of people in general key based plan is the high computational overhead. The late advance on elliptic bend cryptography (ECC) demonstrates that people in general key plans can be more beneficial regarding computational intricacy.

- This scheme proposes an unequivocally secure and productive source mysterious message confirmation (SAMA) plan in light of the ideal altered Elgamal mark (MES) plot on elliptic bends. This MES plan is secure against versatile picked message assaults in the irregular prophet model. This scheme empowers the halfway hubs to verify the message so all tainted message can be identified and dropped to ration the sensor power. While accomplishing trade off flexibility, adaptable time verification and source character insurance, our plan does not have the edge issue, computational intricacy, memory use, and security versatility, since open key based methodologies have a basic and clean key administration.

- In this plan, there is a security server (SS) that is in charge of era, stockpiling and appropriation of the security parameters among the system. This server will never be bargained. Nonetheless, after organization, the sensor nodes may be caught and traded off by attackers. Once traded off, all data put away in the sensor nodes can be gotten to by the attackers. The compromised nodes can be reinvented and completely controlled by the attackers. Not with standing, the compromised nodes won't have the capacity to make new open keys that can be acknowledged by the SS and different nodes.

- The proposed verification plan goes for accomplishing the accompanying objectives: Message Authentication.
- Hop by Hop message authentication.
- Source privacy.

Fig. System Architecture

Advantages:-
- By using the Elliptic curve cryptography, this scheme generates key with smaller size.
- This scheme does not have the threshold limitations.

Disadvantages:-
- This scheme does not provide destination node privacy.
III. CONCLUSION
In order to secure your communication message authentication in very important. through proper message authentication only one can achieve great security. security is the only seed that plant the proper tree of authenticity. this paper is a survey paper in order to investigate the different techniques available in message authentication to prevent false data injection attacks in sensor networks

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