

An Efficient Sharing of Personal Health Records Using DABE in Secure Cloud Environment

T .Parameswaran, S.Vanitha, K.S.Arvind

Abstract— Cloud computing has emerged as one of the most influential paradigms in the IT industry for last few years. Normally data owners and service providers are not in the same trusted domain in cloud computing. Personal health record (PHR) is an emerging patient-centric model of health information exchange, which is often outsourced to be stored at a third party, such as cloud providers, however the information could be exposed to those third party servers and to unauthorized parties. In the existing system, a novel patient-centric framework and a suite of mechanisms for data access control to PHRs stored in semi-trusted servers. To achieve fine-grained and scalable data access control for PHRs, leverage attribute based encryption (ABE) techniques to encrypt each patient's PHR file. A high degree of patient privacy is guaranteed simultaneously by exploiting multi-authority ABE. In proposed System, introduce the concept of Distributed Attribute-Based Encryption (DABE), where an arbitrary number of parties can be present to maintain attributes and their corresponding secret keys. Also two-level access control model introduced, that combines fine-grained access control, which supports the precise granularity for access rules, and coarse-grained access control, which allows the storage provider to manage access requests while learning only limited information from its inputs. This is achieved by arranging outsourced resources into units called access blocks and enforcing access control at the cloud only at the granularity of blocks.

Index Terms— Attribute Based Encryption, Distributed Attributed Based Encryption, PHR, Cloud Computing, Coarse Grain

INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing is a computing model, where resources such as computing power, storage, network and software are abstracted and provided as services on the internet. These services are broadly divided into three categories : Infrastructure-as-a-Service(Iaas), Platform-as-a-Service(PaaS), Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Cloud computing provides on-demand self

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service, in which the different business units are allowed to get the computing resources as they need without having to go through IT for equipment .It supports broad network access, which allows applications to be built in ways that align with how businesses operate today in mobile, multi-device, etc. It allows resource pooling, which allows for pooling of different computing resources to deliver the services to multiple users. It is highly elastic, which allows for quick scalability of resources depending on the demand.

In recent years, personal health record (PHR) has emerged as a patient-centric model of health information exchange. In the existing system they propose a novel ABE-based framework for patient-centric secure sharing of PHRs in cloud computing environments, under the multi-owner settings. To address the key management challenges, they conceptually divide the users in the system into two types of domains, namely public and personal domains. In the public domain, they use multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) to improve the security and avoid key escrow problem. Each attribute authority (AA) in it governs a disjoint subset of user role attributes, while none of them alone is able to control the security of the whole system. They propose mechanisms for key distribution and encryption so that PHR owners can specify personalized fine-grained role-based access policies during file encryption. But it has some security issues. In our proposed system we introduce a two-level access control model that combines fine-grained access control, which supports the precise granularity for access rules, and coarse-grained access control, which allows the storage provider to manage access requests while learning only limited information from its inputs. This is achieved by arranging outsourced resources into units called access blocks and enforcing access control at the cloud only at the granularity of blocks. And also our solution handles the read and writes access control. In recent years, personal health record (PHR) has emerged as a patient-centric model of health information exchange. In the existing system they propose a novel ABE-based framework for patient-centric secure sharing of PHRs in cloud computing environments, under the multi-owner settings. To address the key management challenges, they conceptually divide the users in the system into two types of domains, namely public and personal domains. In the public domain, they use multi-authority ABE (MA-ABE) to improve the security and avoid key escrow problem.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Personal Health Record Using ABE

Personal Health Record (PHR) is an emerging patient-centric model of health information exchange, which is often outsourced to be stored at a third party, such as cloud providers. However, there have been wide privacy concerns as personal health information could be exposed to those third party servers and to unauthorized parties. To assure the patients' control over access to their own PHRs, it is a promising method to encrypt the PHRs before outsourcing. Yet, issues such as risks of privacy exposure, scalability in key management, flexible access and efficient user revocation, have remained the most important challenges toward achieving fine-grained, cryptographically enforced data access control. Ming Li, Shucheng Yu, Yao Zheng and Kui Ren [1] propose a novel patient-centric framework and a suite of mechanisms for data access control to PHRs stored in semi-trusted servers. To achieve fine-grained and scalable data access control for PHRs, and leverage attribute based encryption (ABE) techniques to encrypt each patient's PHR file. Different from previous works in secure data outsourcing, it focus on the multiple data owner scenario, and divide the users in the PHR system into multiple security domains that greatly reduces the key management complexity for owners and users. A high degree of patient privacy is guaranteed simultaneously by exploiting multi-authority ABE. This scheme also enables dynamic modification of access policies or file attributes, supports efficient on-demand user/attribute revocation and break-glass access under emergency scenarios.

B. Securing Personal Health Records

M. Li, S. Yu, K. Ren, and W. Lou [14] proposes a novel and practical framework for fine-grained data access control to PHR data in cloud computing environments, under multi owner settings. To ensure that each owner has full control over her PHR data, they leverage Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) as the encryption primitive, and each owner generates her own set of ABE keys. his way, a patient can selectively shaIn tre her PHR among a set of users by encrypting the file according to a set of attributes, and her encryption and user management

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D. Securing The E-Health Cloud

H. Lohr, A.-R. Sadeghi, and M. Winandy [4] proposes general problems of e-health systems and provide a technical solution for the protection of privacy-sensitive data, which has not been appropriately addressed yet for end-user systems. In particular, Their contributions are as follows: They describe an abstract model of e-health clouds, which comprehends the common entities of healthcare telemetric infrastructures. Based on this model, they outline three main problem areas for security and privacy, namely (i) data storage and processing, (ii) management of e-health infrastructures, and (iii) usability aspects of end-users. They present security architecture for privacy domains in e-health systems which leverages on modern security technology of commodity platforms. This architecture extends the protection of privacy-sensitive data from centrally managed secure networks to the client platforms of the end-users. For each application area a separate privacy domain is established and it is enforced both centrally and locally on each platform.

E. Authorized Private Keyword Search

M. Li, S. Yu, N. Cao, and W. Lou [15] proposes the systematic study the problem of authorized private keyword searches (APKS) over encrypted PHRs in cloud computing. They make the following main contributions. First, they propose a fine-grained authorization framework in which every user obtain search capabilities under the authorization of local trusted 11

Authorities (LTAs), based on checking for user's attributes. The central TA's task is reduced to minimum, and can remain semi-offline after initialization. Using an obtained capability, a user can let the cloud server search through all owners' encrypted PHRs to find the records that match with the query conditions. Their framework enjoys a high level of system scalability for PHR applications in the public domain. To realize such a framework, they make novel use of a recent cryptographic primitive, hierarchical predicate encryption (HPE), which features delegation of search capabilities. Based on HPE they propose two solutions for searching on encrypted PHR documents, APKS and APKS+. The first solution enhances search efficiency, especially for subset and a class of simple range queries, while the second enhances query privacy with the help of proxy servers. Both schemes support multi-dimensional multi-keyword searches and allow delegation and revocation of search capabilities. Finally, they implement their scheme on a modern workstation and carry out extensive performance evaluation. Through experimental results they demonstrate that their scheme is suitable for a wide range of delay-tolerant PHR applications. To the best of their knowledge, their work is the first to address the authorized private search over encrypted PHRs within the public domain.

F. Privacy of Electronic Medical Records

J. Benaloh, m. Chase, e. Horvitz, and k. Lauter [5] proposes the encryption schemes with strong security properties will guarantee that the patient's privacy is protected. However, adherence to a simple encryption scheme can interfere with the desired functionality of health record systems. In particular, they would like to employ encryption, yet support such desirable functions as allowing users to share partial access rights with others and to perform various searches over their records. In what follows, they consider encryption schemes that enable patients to delegate partial decryption rights, and that allow patients (and their delegates) to search over their health data. They shall propose a design that refers to as Patient Controlled Encryption (PCE) as a solution to secure and private storage of patients' medical records. PCE allows the patient to selectively share records among doctors and healthcare providers. The design of the system is based on a hierarchical encryption system. The patient's record is partitioned into a hierarchical structure, each portion of which is encrypted with a corresponding key. The patient is required to store a root secret key, from which a tree of sub keys is derived. The patient can selectively distribute sub keys for decryption of various portions of the record. The patient can also generate and distribute trapdoors for selectively searching portions of the record. Their design prevents unauthorized access to patients' medical data by data storage providers, healthcare providers, pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies, or others who have not been given the appropriate decryption keys. prevents unauthorized access to patients' medical data by data storage providers, healthcare providers, pharmaceutical companies,

insurance companies, or others who have not been given the appropriate decryption keys.

G. Achieving secure, scalable, and fine-grained data access control in cloud computing

Cloud computing is an emerging computing paradigm in which resources of the computing infrastructure are provided as services over the Internet. As promising as it is, this paradigm also brings forth many new challenges for data security and access control when users outsource sensitive data for sharing on cloud servers, which are not within the same trusted domain as data owners. To keep sensitive user data confidential against untrusted servers, existing solutions usually apply cryptographic methods by disclosing data decryption keys only to authorized users. However, in doing so, these solutions inevitably introduce a heavy computation overhead on the data owner for key distribution and data management when fine-grained data access control is desired, and thus do not scale well. The problem of simultaneously achieving fine-grainedness, scalability, and data confidentiality of access control actually still remains unresolved. S. Yu, C. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou addresses this challenging open issue by, on one hand, defining and enforcing access policies based on data attributes, and, on the other hand, allowing the data owner to delegate most of the computation tasks involved in fine-grained data access control to untrusted cloud servers without disclosing the underlying data contents. They achieve this goal by exploiting and uniquely combining techniques of attribute-based encryption (ABE), proxy re-encryption, and lazy re-encryption. Our proposed scheme also has salient properties of user access privilege confidentiality and user secret key accountability. Extensive analysis shows that our proposed scheme is highly efficient and provably secures under existing security models.

II. EXISTING SYSTEM

In the existing system our framework is to provide secure patient-centric PHR access and efficient key management at the same time. The key idea is to divide the system into multiple security domains (namely, *public domains* (PUDs) and *personal domains* (PSDs)) according to the different users' data access requirements. The PUDs consist of users who make access based on their professional roles, such as doctors, nurses and medical researchers. In practice, a PUD can be mapped to an independent sector in the society, such as the health care, government or insurance sector. For each PSD, its users are personally associated with a data owner (such as family members or close friends), and they make accesses to PHRs based on access rights assigned by the owner. In both types of security domains, we utilize ABE to realize cryptographically enforced, patient-centric PHR access. Especially, in a PUD multi-authority ABE is used, in which there are multiple "attribute authorities" (AAs), each governing a disjoint subset of attributes. *Role attributes* are defined for PUDs, representing the professional role or obligations of a PUD user. Users in

- It enhances data and user privacy by protecting access control rules and access patterns from the storage provider




Fig. 2. An example policy realizable using MA-ABE

DBAE(Distributed Attribute Based Encryption)

In this section define the concept of DABE and introduce the required keys and algorithms. The following table provides a quick reference of the most relevant keys.

Users, Attributes and Keys

During setup, a public master key PK and a secret master key MK are generated; PK is available to every party, whereas MK is only known to the master. Every user u maintains a public user key PK_u , which is used by attribute authorities to generate personalized secret attribute keys, and a secret key SK_u , which is used in the decryption operation. Generation and distribution of PK_u and SK_u is the task of the master, who is also required to verify the identity of the users before keys are issued. The keys SK_u and PK_u of a user u are bound to the identity and/or pseudonyms of the user by the master. This binding is crucial for the verification of the user's attributes. Every attribute authority maintains a secret key SK_a which is used to issue secret attribute keys to users. An attribute is a tuple consisting of an identifier of an attribute authority (e.g. an URL) and an identifier describing the attribute itself (an arbitrary string). We will denote the public representation of the attribute as A and use a_A as the identifier of the attribute authority present within A . For every attribute with representation A there is a public key, denoted PK_A , which is issued by the respective attribute authority and is used to encrypt messages. The corresponding secret attribute keys, personalized for eligible users, are issued by the attribute authorities to users who request them (after determining their eligibility). To prevent collusions, every user gets a different secret attribute key that only he can use. A secret attribute key of an attribute A , issued for a user u is denoted by $SK_{A,u}$. We call the set of secret keys that a user has (i.e., the key SK_u and all keys $SK_{A,u}$) his key ring.

The DABE Scheme

The DABE scheme consists of seven fundamental algorithms: *Setup*, *CreateUser*, *CreateAuthority*, *RequestAttributePK*, *RequestAttributeSK*, *Encrypt* and *Decrypt*. The description of the seven algorithms is as follows:

- **Setup:** The *Setup* algorithm takes as input the implicit security parameter $1k$. It outputs the public key PK and the master key MK .
- **CreateUser (PK, MK, u):** The *CreateUser* algorithm takes as input the public key PK , the master key MK , and a user name u . It outputs a public user key PK_u , that will be used by attribute authorities to issue secret attribute keys for u , and a secret user key SK_u , used for the decryption of ciphertexts.
- **CreateAuthority (PK, a):** The *CreateAuthority* algorithm is executed by the attribute authority with identifier a once during initialization. It outputs a secret authority key SK_a .

RequestAttributePK (PK, A, SK_a): The *RequestAttributePK* algorithm is executed by attribute authorities whenever they receive a request for a public attribute key. The algorithm checks whether the authority identifier a_A of A equals a . If this is the case, the algorithm outputs a public attribute key for attribute A , denoted PK_A , otherwise NULL.

- **RequestAttributeSK (PK, A, SK_a, u, PK_u):** The *RequestAttributeSK* algorithm is executed by the attribute authority with identifier a whenever it receives a request for a secret attribute key. The algorithm checks whether the authority identifier a_A of A equals a and whether the user u with public key PK_u is eligible of the attribute A . If this is the case, *RequestAttributeSK* outputs a secret attribute key $SK_{A,u}$ for user u . Otherwise, the algorithm outputs NULL.

- **Encrypt ($PK, M, A, PK_{A1}, \dots, PK_{AN}$):** The *Encrypt* algorithm takes as input the public key PK , a message M , an access policy A and the public keys PK_{A1}, \dots, PK_{AN} corresponding to all attributes occurring in the policy A . The algorithm encrypts M with A and outputs the ciphertext CT .

- **Decrypt($PK, CT, A, SK_u, SK_{A1,u}, \dots, SK_{AN,u}$):** The *Decrypt* algorithm takes as input a ciphertext produced by the *Encrypt* algorithm, an access policy A , under which CT was encrypted, and a key ring $SK_u, SK_{A1,u}, \dots, SK_{AN,u}$ for user u . The algorithm *Decrypt* decrypts the ciphertext CT and outputs the corresponding plaintext M if the attributes were sufficient to satisfy A ; otherwise it outputs NULL.

Note that this scheme differs from CP-ABE] in that the two algorithms *CreateAuthority* and *RequestAttributePK* were added, and CP-ABE's algorithm *KeyGen* is split up into *CreateUser* and *RequestAttributeSK*. It is crucial that *RequestAttributeSK* does not need any components of the master key MK as input, so that every attribute authority is able to independently create attributes. However, we still require that a trusted central party maintains users (executes *CreateUser*), as otherwise collusion attacks would be possible.

The advantage of the adversary in this game is defined as $[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}$, where the probability is taken over all coin tosses of both challenger and adversary. A DABE scheme is secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.

TABLE I. KEY DESCRIPTION OF HEALTH CARE DOMAIN

Key	Description	Usage
PK	Global Key	Input for all operation
MK	Master Key	Creation of user keys
SKa	Secret Key of Attribute authority a	Creation of attribute key
PKa	Public key of attribute a	Encryption
SKu	Secret key of attribute a for user u	Decryption
PKu	Public key of user u	Key request
SKa,u	Secret key of user u	Decryption

Security Model

Setup : The challenger runs the *Setup* algorithm and gives the global key PK to the adversary.

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- The adversary asks the challenger for an arbitrary number of user keys. The challenger calls *CreateUser* for each requested user and returns the resulting public and private user keys to the adversary. For each user the adversary can request an arbitrary number of secret and public attribute keys, that the challenger creates by calling *RequestAttributeSK* or *Request AttributePK*, respectively. Whenever the challenger receives a request for an attribute *A* of authority *a*, he tests whether he has already created a secret key *SKa* for *a*. If not, he first calls *CreateAuthority* to create the appropriate authority key (note that *SKa* will not be made available to the adversary).

Challenge : The adversary submits two messages *M0* and *M1* and an access policy *A* such that none of the users that he created in Phase 1 satisfy *A*. (If any user from Phase 1 satisfies *A*, the challenger aborts.) As before, the challenger may have to call *CreateAuthority* to initialize attribute authorities. The challenger flips a coin *b*, encrypts *Mb* under *A*, and gives the ciphertext CT to the adversary.

- The adversary may create an arbitrary number of users. He can also request more secret attribute keys for the users he created in Phase 1 and 2, but if any secret attribute key would give the respective user a set of attributes needed to satisfy *A*, the challenger aborts. As before, the adversary can always request any public attribute key.

Guess: The adversary outputs a guess *b'* of *b*.

Two level access control

In this a hybrid solution suggest that offers a way to trade off privacy and efficiency guarantees. The basic idea behind it is to provide two levels of access control: coarse-grained and fine-grained. The coarse grained level access control will be enforced explicitly by the cloud provider and it would also represent the granularity at which he will learn the access pattern of users. Even though the cloud provider will learn the access pattern over all user requests, he will not be able to distinguish requests from different users, which would come in the form of anonymous tokens. The fine-grained access control will be enforced obliviously to the cloud through encryption and would prevent him from differentiating requests that result in the same coarse-grained access control decision but have different fine-grained access pattern. The mapping between files and access blocks is transparent to the users in the sense that they can submit file requests without knowing in what blocks the files are contained. While most existing solutions focus on read request, we present a solution that provides both read and write access control. Choosing the granularity for the access blocks in the read and write access control schemes affects the privacy guarantees for the scheme as well as its efficiency performance.

IV. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have proposed a novel framework of secure sharing of personal health records in cloud computing by using DABE. Considering partially trustworthy cloud servers, argue that to fully realize the patient-centric concept, patients shall have complete control of their own privacy through encrypting their PHR files to allow fine-grained access. The framework addresses the unique challenges brought by multiple PHR owners and users, in that greatly reduce the complexity of key management while enhance the privacy guarantees compared with previous works. We utilize ABE to encrypt the PHR data, so that the patients can allow access not only by personal users, but also various users from public domains with different professional roles, qualifications and affiliations. Further enhancement could be done on an existing DABE scheme to handle efficient and on-demand user revocation, and prove its security.

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